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98 N.C. L. REV. 1029 (2020) 
INTRODUCTION: LEGAL ETHICS IN THE AGE OF 
TRUMP* 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT** 
The North Carolina Law Review has had a long tradition of excellent 
symposia on significant legal developments, but its timing this year may be the 
Review’s best ever. Just a few weeks before the symposium convened in 
October, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Nancy 
Pelosi, authorized the initiation of a formal impeachment inquiry against 
President Donald Trump.1 Over the subsequent nine weeks, the House moved 
expeditiously, and controversially, to impeach the President for abuse of power 
for (1) soliciting the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, to open a 
criminal investigation into one of his political rivals, former Vice President 
Joseph Biden, and for (2) obstruction of Congress for ordering others in his 
administration not to comply and refusing to comply himself with lawful 
congressional subpoenas to elicit information about the Ukraine affair.2 In the 
span between January 16, 2020, and February 6, 2020, the Senate acquitted the 
President after conducting the shortest impeachment trial yet for a President 
and the only impeachment trial ever conducted in the Senate without 
witnesses.3 Yet, throughout it all, the President did not act alone: the hearings 
 
 *  © 2020 Michael J. Gerhardt. 
 **  Burton Craige Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence, University of North Carolina School 
of Law. I wish to extend my thanks to editors Erin Bennett and Evelyn Yarborough for their excellent 
work in coordinating and producing our symposium.  
  Editor’s Note: Professor	Gerhardt	testified in front of the House Judiciary Committee on	July 
12, 2019, on constitutional options for addressing presidential misconduct, and again on	December 4, 
2019, regarding the constitutional grounds for the impeachment of President Donald J. Trump. He 
was one of three such scholars (along with Professor Noah Feldman from Harvard Law School and 
Professor Pamela S. Karlan from Stanford Law School) invited by House Democrats to serve as 
witnesses in the	Trump	proceeding.	He also served as CNN’s impeachment expert throughout the 
proceedings against President Trump, reprising a role that he performed for CNN during President 
Clinton’s impeachment proceedings.	 In the latter, he testified as the only joint witness before the 
House Judiciary Committee when it considered grounds for impeaching President Clinton. 
 1. Nicholas Fandos, Nancy Pelosi Announces Formal Impeachment Inquiry of Trump, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/us/politics/democrats-impeachment-
trump.html [http://perma.cc/M2KK-9ANZ (dark archive)]. 
 2. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE IMPEACHMENT OF DONALD J. TRUMP 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 116-346, at 4–5 (2019); see also Grace Panetta, 
Everything You Need To Know About Trump’s Impeachment Process: What’s Happened, Who the Players Are, 
and What Comes Next, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2020) https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-
impeachment-major-players-timeline-what-comes-next-2019-11 [https://perma.cc/3VZQ-5T3D]. 
 3. See Peter Baker, Impeachment Trial Updates: Senate Acquits Trump, Ending Historic Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/impeachment-vote.html 
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and news reports revealed involvement of several White House, National 
Security, State Department, and Office of Management and Budget lawyers 
whose actions were legally and ethically dubious, both in the Ukraine affair and 
the ensuing impeachment process in Congress.4 Additionally, in the Senate 
trial, the President’s lawyers not only skirted but often clearly breached ethical 
rules. How the decisions and actions (or nonactions) of these lawyers are 
worked out in the long run will be crucial for clarifying how far lawyers may go 
to justify and facilitate a President’s refusals to comply with a legal process he 
or she deems illegitimate, especially one that falls within the unique, or sole, 
power of another branch. 
Considering ethical and legal constraints on what government lawyers, 
and lawyers who represent government officials, including the President, may 
say or do when Congress exercises its impeachment authority is hardly new. 
Watergate and its aftermath come quickly to mind as the most apt of 
precedents.5 In the wake of President Richard Nixon’s resignation from office 
in August 1974, a serious effort was undertaken to require the teaching of legal 
ethics in law schools.6 This was done with the hope that such instruction would 
inculcate in young lawyers the ethical rules and constraints with which they 
must abide, even when they are working for the most powerful political leader 
in the world—the President of the United States.7 The contributions to our 
symposium provide valuable insights on how well that planned instruction has 
worked, particularly since lawyers were closely involved in each step of how the 
administration handled, or arranged, to delay national security funding for 
 
[https://perma.cc/QV4F-KAKY (dark archive)]; Jennifer Haberkorn et al., Senate Votes Against Calling 
Witnesses in Trump Impeachment Trial, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/politics/
story/2020-01-31/senate-impeach-trump-trial [https://perma.cc/RJ8H-L89W].  
 4. See, e.g., Letter from Pat Cipollone, White House Counsel, to House Leaders (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://games-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/7cb26618-e770-45ef-9c45-
bdd5554ce201/note/9608d380-f0df-4e07-8b08-8f326b723626.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/6L2P-
HBCP]; Deb Reichmann, Impeachment Inquiry Focuses on 2 White House Lawyers, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://apnews.com/01f2000ce18f44e89a8079ba6af2b546 [https://perma.cc/ENZ3-
RFG8]. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 116-346, at 2–3, 5 (2019) (chronicling the Ukraine call and the 
involvement of the President’s private attorney, and the President’s urging of executive officials to 
refuse to comply with congressional subpoenas).  
 5. Though the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility were already in effect at the time of 
Watergate, the discussion of their relevance to the proceedings (and to the conduct of the President, 
who was a lawyer) largely occurred after the proceedings, particularly with respect to the necessity for 
teaching them in law school. See generally Michael Ariens, The Agony of Modern Legal Ethics, 1970–1985, 
5 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 134 (2015) (chronicling the renewed attention given 
to legal ethics in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the impetus behind mandating the instruction 
of ethics in ABA-approved law schools).  
 6. Mark Hansen, 1965–1974: Watergate and the Rise of Legal Ethics, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/1965_1974_watergate_and_the_rise_of_legal_ethics 
[https://perma.cc/426P-RXPX]. 
 7. See id. 
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Ukraine in an apparent exchange for its leader’s announcement of opening a 
criminal investigation into former Vice President Biden and his son, Hunter. 
The symposium’s subject—ethics in the age of Trump—was concededly 
broad but not unbounded. Such a subject could go well beyond the President 
and the lawyers in his administration to encompass lawyering more generally 
over the past decade, which, admittedly, has raised a disturbing range of ethical 
dilemmas, including a managing partner of one of the nation’s most elite law 
firms paying intermediaries to defraud colleges to improve his daughter’s 
chances for admission;8 lawyers who used the power of their offices to 
intimidate witnesses and to expose the identity of a whistleblower in violation 
of federal law;9 and a former Attorney General who had refused to comply with 
a legislative subpoena to produce internal documents relating to the so-called 
Fast and Furious Operation.10 This symposium focused specifically on private 
and public lawyering associated with the President and his administration that 
preceded and is likely ongoing since the activities that gave rise to the 
President’s impeachment. The event brought together some of the nation’s 
leading scholars to discuss the legal and ethical ramifications of prosecutorial 
discretion in the Trump Administration; the efforts and duties of White House 
and other administration lawyers doing the President’s bidding and perhaps 
facilitating his misconduct, as set forth in the Articles of Impeachment; and the 
private lawyers representing the President and other administration officials 
with respect to the House Intelligence Committee and House Judiciary 
Committee investigations that culminated in the President’s impeachment. 
Several themes emerged from the contributions to the symposium. Here 
are just three: issues surrounding situational ethics, concerns about possible 
violations of ethical norms particularly in the context of interactions between 
the Trump Administration and Ukraine, and opportunities for ethical reforms 
to the practice of law in this country.  
 
 8. Nick Anderson, Ex-Leader at New York Law Firm Gets One Month in Prison in College Admissions 
Scandal, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/10/03/ex-
leader-new-york-law-firm-gets-one-month-prison-college-admissions-scandal/ [http://perma.cc/
P9DH-BG2F (dark archive)]. 
 9. Igor Derysh, Texas GOP Rep. Louie Gohmert Names Alleged Whistleblower at Televised 
Impeachment Hearing, SALON (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/12/12/texas-gop-rep-louie-
gohmert-names-alleged-whistleblower-at-televised-impeachment-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/2C6M-
C6XQ]; Rachel Frazin, Impeachment Witnesses Come Under Threats, Harassment, HILL (Nov. 23, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/471703-impeachment-witnesses-come-under-threats-harassment 
[http://perma.cc/27K7-443N]; Dan Sweeney, Florida Bar Will Investigate U.S. Rep. Matt Gaetz over 
Potential Witness Intimidation, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale May 8, 2019), https://www.sun-
sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-ne-gaetz-cohen-bar-investigation-20190508-
vrdxkbxjyrcqzfypyxwnxxtmiq-story.html [https://perma.cc/U59B-T5YB]. 
 10. Tim Ryan, Justice Dep’t Settles with House Panel on “Fast and Furious” Records, COURTHOUSE 
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/justice-dept-settles-with-house-panel-
on-fast-furious-records/ [https://perma.cc/P9NU-UU9G]. 
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First, a dominant concern throughout the Articles is “situational ethics”—
the idea that the ethics of specific acts and decisions should be assessed within 
their context.11 Numerous factors come into play when assessing the situational 
ethics of any act or decision.12 Specifically in the context of the presidency, 
where someone is within the hierarchy of the administration, to whom (and to 
what extent) people inside and outside of the administration owe duties of 
candor and truthfulness, and the acts and decisions themselves, are all essential 
considerations for any analysis. For example, some of the people in the current 
administration, including the President and the Secretary of State, are not 
lawyers, and therefore their actions and duties are not governed by any code of 
professional conduct but by the Constitution, our laws, and determinations (in 
the context of impeachment proceedings) on whether they abused power, 
breached the public trust, and/or seriously injured the Republic.13 Thus, the two 
Articles of Impeachment approved against President Trump charged him with 
no criminal misconduct or violations for which he could go to prison.14 Instead, 
the House determined that the President’s abuse of powers and obstruction of 
Congress violated the Constitution, the supreme law of the land.15 As such, the 
actions were illegal and sufficiently serious misconduct to warrant his 
impeachment. 
Impeachment articles aside, President Trump, along with every other 
official in his administration, is also subject to possible legal sanctions for 
refusing to comply with congressional subpoenas.16 Congressional subpoenas 
are lawful orders, the violations of which provide the bases for contempt of 
Congress and possible fines and even jail time.17 It is useful to remember as well 
that federal law requires executive branch employees to refrain from taking any 
personal benefits in exchange for doing their jobs.18 Even if this law does not 
 
 11. See generally Randall Grometstein, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Noble-Cause Corruption, 43 
CRIM. L. BULL. 63, 66–67 (2007) (discussing the elements of situational ethics). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.; see also Richie Duchon & Alex Johnson, House Judiciary Committee Publishes Full 
Impeachment Report, NBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-
impeachment-inquiry/house-judiciary-committee-publishes-full-impeachment-report-n1102531 
[https://perma.cc/97TT-35P5]. 
 16. See Jan Wolfe, Explainer: How Powerful Are Congress Subpoenas, Contempt Citations?, REUTERS 
(May 2, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-congress-subpoena-explainer/explainer-
how-powerful-are-congress-subpoenas-contempt-citations-idUSKCN1S81FP 
[https://perma.cc/6TVU-G5H2]. But see Comm. on Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 516–22 (D.C. 
Cir. 2020) (holding that the judiciary lacks the power to adjudicate operations disputes between the 
other branches of government, and that as such, federal courts are unable to force a member of the 
executive branch to comply with a legislative subpoena), reh’g en banc granted sub nom. U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Mnuchin, No. 19-5176, 2020 WL 1228477 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 17. Wolfe, supra note 16. 
 18. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2018). 
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apply directly to the President, it does apply to his cabinet secretaries and 
everyone else within his administration,19 and any of them could be terminated 
for such misconduct.20 For many members of Congress, the fact that the 
President has done something for which everyone else in the administration 
could be fired justifies his impeachment rather than any absolution.21 There is 
no presidential immunity for a President’s abuse of power or any other 
impeachable offense.22 In addition to issues of executive immunity, serving in 
Congress does not protect a member, or a member’s staff, from punishment for 
violating federal laws (for instance, failing to protect the identity of a 
whistleblower) or intimidating witnesses who appear before them.23 
All the aforementioned laws and ethical strictures apply to others in the 
administration besides the President, such as the Attorney General, the White 
House Counsel, the Counsel to the National Security Council, and the 
President’s legal counsel, including the lawyers who defended him before the 
House and the Senate. Two of the four Presidents who previously faced serious 
impeachment—Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton—were lawyers and were 
disbarred (at least temporarily) for some of their misconduct.24 Lawyers who 
occupy these positions in the current administration and were, in the words of 
the President’s Ambassador to the European Union, “in the loop” of the scheme 
to pressure Ukraine’s leader to make an announcement beneficial to the 
President’s reelection25 are subject to similar sanctions for facilitating any illegal 
activity, which includes any abuse of power. As lawyers, their involvement with 
these activities needs to be viewed in light of the ethical rules that bind the 
profession. It is not clear whether some of these lawyers may seek refuge in 
Rule 5.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which says that “[a] 
 
 19. See id. § 201(a). 
 20. Id. § 201(b). 
 21. See Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 22. See Susan Davis, Precedent Favors Democrats in Power Struggle with Trump, but It Could Take 
Awhile, NPR (May 15, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/15/722872600/precedent-favors-
democrats-in-power-struggle-with-trump-but-it-could-take-a-whil [https://perma.cc/F4LA-D3BA]. 
 23. See generally TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45043, UNDERSTANDING THE 
SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE (Dec. 1, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45043.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3TVG-WJK6] (discussing the limitations and protections of the Speech or Debate 
Clause of the Constitution). 
 24. See e.g., Tom Goldstein, New York Court Disbars Nixon for Watergate Acts, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 
1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/07/09/archives/new-york-court-disbars-nixon-for-watergate-
acts-nixon-disbarred-by.html [https://perma.cc/E37M-Y5W4 (dark archive)]; David A. Graham & 
Cullen Murphy, The Clinton Impeachment, as Told by the People Who Lived It, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/12/clinton-impeachment/573940/ 
[https://perma.cc/YGX3-DGFK (dark archive)] (discussing the five-year suspension of President 
Clinton’s law license).  
 25. Editorial Board, ‘Everyone Was in the Loop’: Gordon Sondland Makes Two Stunning Points, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/everyone-
was-in-the-loop-gordon-sondland-makes-two-stunning-points/2019/11/20/c57ea992-0bbf-11ea-8397-
a955cd542d00_story.html [https://perma.cc/F3QF-6KNM (dark archive)]. 
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subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that 
lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of 
an arguable question of professional duty.”26 Yet, that rule is not a safe harbor 
for either the Attorney General or the Chief White House Counsel since 
neither is “subordinate” to any attorney. Nor is that rule refuge for committing 
illegal and inappropriate activity.27 One significant lesson of Watergate, as well 
as the Nuremberg Trials, is that merely following orders is not a defense to the 
participation in cover-ups or other crimes ordered by superiors.28 All such actors 
are “in the loop” and covered by the ethical rules taught in law schools since 
Watergate and adopted, in some form, in every state.29 These actors are also 
subject to departmental or agency regulations governing their conduct, the 
violations of which are also grounds for dismissal and other sanctions. Thus, 
when assessing the ethics of administration lawyers or private counsel for the 
President, such as Michael Cohen (who went to jail) and Rudy Giuliani (whom 
the President acknowledged after the trial was, in fact, doing his bidding in 
looking for dirt on the Bidens in Ukraine30), the particular circumstances of the 
attorneys at the time of possible misconduct should be the focus of attention. 
Serving in the government or representing the President is not a get-out-of-
jail-free card or a pass on complying with the rules of professional 
responsibility. 
Second, I hasten to acknowledge that much is still not known about what 
particular lawyers said and did (or did not do) with respect to the Ukraine affair 
and refusals to comply with lawful subpoenas. When, for example, the Counsel 
to the National Security Council, John Eisenberg, told Lieutenant Colonel 
Alexander Vindman, who had concerns about the propriety of the July 25, 2019, 
phone call between the President and Ukraine’s newly elected President, not to 
talk to anyone else, and then proceeded to store the transcript on the nation’s 
most secret server (which is meant for protecting sensitive codes),31 it is not 
 
 26. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2019). 
 27. Douglas R. Richmond, Academic Silliness About Model Rule 5.2(b), 19 PROF. LAW. 15, 18 (2009) 
(“In short, subordinate lawyers always have a duty to question supervisory lawyers’ ethical judgments 
and oppose illegal commands even in the presence of Rule 5.2(b).”). 
 28. See Hansen, supra note 6; Anthony Lewis, The Argument of “Acting Under Orders” Doesn’t Work, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/05/archives/the-argument-of-acting-
under-orders-doesnt-work-lessons-of.html [https://perma.cc/E5ZY-PL7L (dark archive)].  
 29. Hansen, supra note 6. 
 30. See Marshall Cohen, Trump Contradicts Past Denials, Admits Sending Giuliani to Ukraine, CNN 
(Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/13/politics/trump-rudy-giuliani-ukraine-interview/
index.html [https://perma.cc/AER3-BVSB]; see also Jordan Fabian & Bill Allison, Giuliani’s Tangled 
Role with Trump Skirts Conflicts, Tests Laws,  BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-17/giuliani-s-tangled-role-with-trump-skirts-
conflicts-tests-laws [https://perma.cc/68PW-YGYT (dark archive)].  
 31. Jeremy Herb, Impeachment Testimony: Vindman Was Told Not To Discuss Trump-Zelensky Call, 
CNN (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/01/politics/alexander-vindman-john-eisenberg-
testimony/index.html [http://perma.cc/P2YU-ZL8W]. 
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clear, at least yet, whether he was taking any of these actions as parts of a cover-
up or an effort to do an investigation of the President’s possible misconduct. So 
many lawyers involved in the circumstances leading to the President’s 
impeachment refused to testify before Congress or participate in any inquiry 
into those circumstances. Their refusal raises significant questions about the 
lawyers’ compliance with Rule 3.3.32 The Rule requires all lawyers, even those 
in the highest reaches of the executive branch, to be candid and truthful in their 
statements and actions in legal proceedings, including legislative ones.33 
The concerns about Trump’s lawyers violating Rule 3.3 became more 
acute—and more apparent—in his Senate trial. I have made this argument 
before, both in commentary on air with CNN and in print.34 Nor am I alone in 
thinking the lawyers violated Rule 3.3. The rule requires that lawyers not “make 
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement 
of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”35 The 
comments to the Rule make clear that legislative bodies such as the Senate count 
as tribunals for purposes of the rule. Rule 8.4 forbids lawyers from “engag[ing] 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” and from 
“conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”36 Rule 3.7 forbids 
 
 32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2019) (“There are 
circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative 
misrepresentation.”); see also id. r. 3.3 cmt. 12 (“[3.3(b)] requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial 
measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person . . . has engaged 
in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding.”). 
 33. See id. r. 3.3. 
 34. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Four Fundamental Flaws in President Trump’s Impeachment Trial Memo, 
JUST SECURITY (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68181/four-fundamental-flaws-in-
President-trumps-impeachment-trial-memo/ [https://perma.cc/9M7E-HUZS]; Michael J. Gerhardt, 
Trump’s Impeachment Defense Boils Down to This: Treat Me Like a King, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/12/trumps-impeachment-defense-boils-down-this-
treat-me-like-an-english-king/ [http://perma.cc/L52R-XXT4 (dark archive)] [hereinafter Gerhardt, 
Boils Down]. I cite these in response to Professor Jonathan Turley’s taking me to task for questioning 
the White House lawyers’ ethics without substantiating my claim. Indeed, he claims the aspersion, 
without foundation, is an ethical problem. It was not hard to find the claims I made, including in 
Professor Turley’s hometown newspaper, and it is sadly ironic that he stoops to an attack on me 
personally, the go-to method made by the President and his defenders when they cannot and do not 
argue substance. Professor Turley’s equating zealous lawyering with breaking the rules is problematic 
too. A good lawyer never practices close to the ethical boundaries, while ethically challenged lawyers 
are eager to take refuge in their overstated protections accorded for zealous advocacy. The rules 
themselves do not call for zealous advocacy but instead place a number of ethical constraints on lawyers 
not just bending but breaking the law or the rules to please their clients. Nor am I alone in raising 
concerns about the White House lawyers’ over-zealous advocacy. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Impeachment 
Trial and Legal Ethics: Cipollone Should Be a Witness, Not a Trump Lawyer, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 27, 
2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68264/impeachment-trial-and-legal-ethics-pat-cipollone-should-
be-a-witness-not-a-trump-lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/RH23-J5G6]. The House Managers made this 
same argument in a January 21 letter to Mr. Cipollone. See id.  
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a). 
 36. See id. r. 8.4 (c)–(d).  
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lawyers from being advocates and witnesses on the same matter, which raises a 
problem for Chief White House Counsel Pat Cipollone, whom John Bolton 
says was present when the President pushed him to pressure Ukraine.37 
I need not mention all the statements of White House lawyers that skirt 
or run afoul of Rules 3.3 and 8.4, but here are some examples of troublesome 
conduct:  
(1) Mr. Cipollone telling the Senate that the House Managers “hid 
evidence” from the Senate (there is nothing to support that assertion);38  
(2) Mr. Cipollone claiming that the House Managers did not “believe in 
the facts of their case” (completely contrary to the facts);39  
(3) Mr. Cipollone complaining that “[n]ot even Mr. Schiff’s Republican 
colleagues were allowed into” the special room where witnesses were testifying 
before the Committee on the Ukraine affair (completely false, the Republican 
committee members were all allowed to be present);40  
(4) President Trump’s personal attorney, Jay Sekulow, telling the Senate 
that the President was “denied the right to access evidence” and “the right to 
have counsel present at hearings” (the President and his counsel were invited 
to participate in the House Judiciary Committee hearings but declined);41  
(5) Mr. Sekulow saying the Mueller Report showed “no obstruction” (in 
fact it listed multiple instances of it);42  
(6) Mr. Cipollone commenting that the Ukraine aide was given “on time” 
(in fact the delay caused by the President prevented all the aid from being given 
to Ukraine in time to meet the deadline set for the appropriation);43  
 
 37. Id. r. 3.7 (limiting the ability of an attorney to “act as an advocate at a trial in which [he] is 
likely to be a necessary witness” except in those circumstances when “(1) the testimony relates to an 
uncontested issue; (2) the testimony	relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the 
case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client”); see also 
Gillers, supra note 34.  
 38. Calvin Woodward, AP Fact Check: Trump’s Impeachment Defense and the Facts, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Jan. 25, 2020), https://apnews.com/2ce0cdd506b5347b69607a1cabe7d1ab [https://perma.cc/
XY3Z-DTRJ]. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Max Boot, Trump’s Lawyers Are Playing a Bad Hand Badly, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/22/democrats-are-winning-argument-even-
though-theyll-lost-senate-trial/ [https://perma.cc/49FW-83Z9 (dark archive)]; Aaron Rupar, Trump’s 
Lawyers Began the Impeachment Trial with a Blizzard of Lies, VOX (Jan. 21, 2020), 
https://www.vox.com/2020/1/21/21075791/trump-impeachment-lawyers-jay-sekulow-pat-cipollone-
opening-statement [https://perma.cc/ KVL9-8NUM].  
 41. See Rupar, supra note 40.  
 42. Daniel Dale, Fact Check: Trump Lawyers Make At Least Three False Claims During Impeachment 
Arguments, CNN (Jan. 22, 2020), https://cnn.com/2020/01/22/politics/trump-lawyers-impeachment-
false-claims-scif/index.html [https://perma.cc/NW4H-JEFA]; see also Boot, supra note 40 (discussing 
Mr. Sekulow’s commentary on the Mueller Report).  
 43. Bart Jansen et al., Senate Adopts Rules for Trump Impeachment Trial Following Marathon Session, 
11 Defeated Amendments, USA TODAY (Jan. 22, 2020) https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
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(7) Deputy White House Counsel Michael Purpura declaring “[t]here was 
no quid pro quo on the call” in spite of the President’s own chief of staff 
admitting there was;44  
(8) Professor Alan Dershowitz claiming that a President who thought his 
reelection was in the nation’s best interest could solicit foreign interference on 
his behalf (even though neither the law nor the Constitution allow a President 
to do this);45  
(9) Mr. Cipollone charging that Adam Schiff “manufactured a fraudulent 
version of [the] phone call”46 and that his paraphrase of the call was “a complete 
fake” (in fact, the call transcript was already public at the time and Schiff’s 
characterizations were consistent with it); and  
(10) Deputy White House Counsel Patrick Philbin asserting that Rudy 
Giuliani was not engaged in “foreign policy” on behalf of the United States 
(though Giuliani and others say he did just that, and the President admitted 
that after the trial) and that it was not illegal for the President to solicit foreign 
assistance for his reelection (neither the Constitution nor any law of this land 
allows a President to do this).47  
In denying the assertion made in John Bolton’s forthcoming book that he 
was present at a meeting when the President urged Bolton to pressure Ukraine’s 
President to make the announcement of the opening of a criminal investigation 
of the Bidens, Mr. Cipollone made himself a witness in the same matter in 
which he was performing as an advocate. (And the President waived any claim 
of executive privilege to keep private conversations he had with Bolton when 
he publicly declared Bolton’s account false.48)  
 Apart from the impeachment hearings, Attorney General William Barr, 
too, has been the subject of ethical concerns. Since the beginning of the year 




 44. The New York Times, Trump Impeachment: Highlights of Saturday’s Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/25/us/politics/trump-impeachment-hearings-saturday.html 
[https://perma.cc/F44D-PNU8 (dark archive)].  
 45. Eliza Relman & Sonam Sheth, Trump Lawyer Alan Dershowitz Argues Trump Can Do Whatever 
He Wants To Get Reelected If He Believes Another Term Is in the Public Interest, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 29, 
2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/alan-dershowitz-trump-re-election-public-interest-2020-1 
[https://perma.cc/B3XZ-3SFA]. 
 46. See Rupar, supra note 40.  
 47. Dareh Gregorian, White House’s Philbin Suggests President Will Keep Using Giuliani as 
International ‘Confidante,’ NBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-
impeachment-inquiry/live-blog/trump-impeachment-trial-live-coverage-senators-ask-questions-
witness-battle-n1126271/ncrd1126941#liveBlogHeader [https://perma.cc/DSL9-65BR].  
 48. See Barbara McQuade, Trump Waived Executive Privilege When He Called Bolton a Liar, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/27/trump-waived-executive-
privilege-when-he-called-bolton-liar/ [https://perma.cc/X64B-CC7K (dark archive)].  
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concerning Barr and speeches he made in the fall of 2019.49 On January 8, 2020, 
the Association sent a letter to both chambers of Congress requesting an 
investigation into the activities of Attorney General Barr citing concerns that 
they “threaten[] public confidence in the fair and impartial administration of 
justice.”50 Later, on February 12, the New York City Bar Association wrote a 
letter to the Department of Justice Inspector General and the leaders of both 
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees requesting formal investigations 
into Barr’s and the Department’s “making prosecutorial decisions based not on 
neutral principles but in order to protect President Trump’s supporters and 
friends.”51 Presumably, the Inspector General and House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees might identify whether Barr and/or any other high-ranking 
departmental officials have committed any violations of any laws, regulations, 
or ethical rules warranting impeachment or other possible sanctions for their 
misconduct. At the time of the publication of our Symposium, neither the 
Inspector General nor either Judicial Committee had yet taken any steps to 
investigate the circumstances relating to apparent preferential treatment given 
to the President’s friends and supporters.  
Last but not least, the Symposium considered what reforms may be needed 
to prevent any further circumvention of ethical norms and rules. It is naïve to 
think that merely requiring the instruction of legal ethics in law schools will 
ensure lawyers comport themselves in perfect accordance with the rules of 
professional responsibility. Such instruction might have diminished the 
numbers of lawyers who engage in unethical conduct, but there is no proof of 
such a consequence and, as we all know, much unethical lawyering goes 
undetected because of efforts to keep it below radar. For example, in refusing 
to comply with legislative subpoenas to elicit information about possible abuse 
of power, White House lawyers make it more difficult, if not impossible for the 
public to hold them accountable for their ethical breaches. If such non-
compliance goes unchecked, these lawyers leave office with the confidence of 
knowing they leave behind—hidden from any authorities that could hold them 
accountable—their subversions of law, support for or participation in abuses of 
power, and failures to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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news/article/new-york-city-bar-association-calls-for-investigation-into-ag-barr [https://perma.cc/
G997-994G].  
 51. Jennifer Rubin, The New York City Bar Goes After William Barr, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2020), 
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Perhaps most confounding is the question of whether lawyers’ justification 
for the forced silence of so many witnesses passes constitutional muster because 
it has been done arguably in service of a (dubious) theory of absolute executive 
entitlement to maintain control over information produced within and by the 
executive branch. The claim of any such entitlement is grounded in the unitary 
theory of the executive, which posits that all executive power must be under the 
control of the President.52 The problem is that the theory has no grounding in 
constitutional law, except for Justice Scalia’s sole dissent in Morrison v. Olson.53 
Judicial precedents, as well as legislative practice, cut in the other direction.54 
When the Chief White House Counsel grounds his refusal to comply with a 
legislative inquiry and legislative subpoenas on the basis of such a theory, he 
seeks refuge in the dangerous and legally unsound principle that he, like the 
President, is above the law.55 The Symposium may not have fully addressed the 
question of whether the silence of lawyers and their refusals to comply with 
legislative inquiries and subpoenas is illegal and unethical, but it hopefully will 
enrich lawyers’ understandings of how to analyze their ethical obligations when 
asked to support or defend unconstitutional abuses of power or illegal conduct. 
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now-defunct Tenure in Office Act and Supreme Court cases concerning the removal powers of the 
President as historical limitations on the President’s control over the executive branch); Mark Tushnet, 
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Each of the four symposium Articles56 offers significant insights into this 
compelling question. First, in Congressional Subpoenas in Court, Amandeep 
Grewal, professor of law at the University of Iowa Law School, looks at the 
question of whether Congress has standing to enlist judicial enforcement of the 
subpoenas that President Trump and other administration officials refused to 
comply with. To answer the question, he adopts a “public trust approach” for 
understanding that Congress and its individual members “exercise authority 
only in representational capacities.”57 Therefore, he suggests, the only harm 
Congress or its members may incur as a result of refusals to comply with the 
House’s subpoenas is not personal. Without any personal injury, Congress lacks 
standing to ask for judicial enforcement of its subpoenas. He goes further to 
examine the complications that are likely to arise if the Court is asked to enforce 
such subpoenas. This is precisely the question the Supreme Court has agreed 
to hear in cases set for argument this year.58 
Next, Rebecca Roiphe, a professor of law at New York Law School and 
former prosecutor, examines in A Typology of Justice Department Lawyers’ Roles 
and Responsibilities the ethical norms and institutional practices of Justice 
Department lawyers that the President has attacked. She suggests that the 
answer to how Justice Department lawyers should comport themselves 
“depends on the position that the lawyer holds and the work that the lawyer is 
doing.”59 There is no one-size-fits-all for Justice Department lawyers but 
instead “the Department of Justice ought to strike a proper balance between 
responsiveness and independence, ensuring effectiveness and accountability 
while maintaining enough independence from the President to guarantee the 
orderly development of the law and its fair application.”60 This means, as she 
explains, that department lawyers have “different roles” and are bound by “the 
ethical obligations that ought to accompany those roles.”61 In determining these 
obligations, she states, “[t]he goal is to maintain the neutrality of law and its 
even-handed application to objectively determined facts, so that the 
 
 56. One participant in the Symposium, Richard Painter, professor of law at the University of 
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Department of Justice can remain a constraint on power while not unnecessarily 
hobbling the elected officials in their ability to implement policy.”62 As she 
illustrates through a series of examples, this “goal” informs department lawyers’ 
decisionmaking and ethical obligations in practice. 
In Defending the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes, Andrew Hessick, a 
professor of law at the University of North Carolina School of Law, examines 
the role of Justice Department lawyers defending federal statutes, a role that he 
suggests lacks ethical foundation. This role is further complicated when it is 
unclear whether “defending” the constitutionality of a federal statute “is in the 
interest of the United States.”63 In practice, an omnipresent concern is that 
there is pressure on Justice Department lawyers to do the bidding of their 
superiors and, therefore, they may have far less interest in protecting 
congressional prerogatives, or none, than they do in protecting the President 
from Congress. He uses the example of the Affordable Care Act to illustrate 
the phenomenon of how, in pushing the executive branch’s self-interest in 
litigation, the Department of Justice has undermined Congress’s role as 
policymaker. 
Finally, in Training Law Students To Maintain Civility in Their Law Practices 
as a Way To Improve Public Discourse, Nancy Rapoport, professor of law at the 
University of Nevada-Las Vegas, turns her attention to the challenges of 
training law students at a time of severe political divisiveness, the very 
challenges that the push to teach professional responsibility in every law school 
was designed to address. Students are prone to reflect the same disdain for an 
opponent’s arguments as our leaders do. To combat this, she suggests a renewed 
commitment to teaching students how to have a civil discussion when arguing 
about the law or asserting their positions in court or other venues.64 This is 
easier to describe than to do, but she shows us how focusing on the issues, 
respecting other people’s views, and acting with genuine humility may restore 
lawyers’ valuable contributions to society, including becoming models for the 
nation as a whole. Professor Rapoport’s invaluable reminder of lawyers’ 
constructive role in society—not just in courts, the executive branch, and 
legislatures—captures well the purpose of our collective undertaking in this 
issue. And it raises a direct challenge to government or White House lawyers 
who see their duty as covering up a President’s misdeeds. These lawyers learned 
nothing from the Watergate saga.  
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